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TOWARDS A FOREIGN POLICY OF MUTUALITY
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana
~~ }(tt~;.?fer Saturday, June 10, 1972, 10:00 a.m., M.D.T.

-------

I come here today to convey a word of optimism regarding

the nation's foreign relations.

Optimism in this connection is

long overdue; still, I hope my reference to it at this t i me is
not premature.

Whatever the case, my expectation is that history

may well record 1972 as the year in which a corner was turned
f or peace.

There are i ndications that the world is headed back

towards constructive human purpose in its major internat i onal
relationships.

A water-shed appears t o have been reached after a

quarter century of dangerous dallying in the murky detours o f the
Cold War.
Insofar as the government of this nation is concerned,
except in the case of Indochina, I believe the President is
responding in a new fashion to international circumstances.
is projecting not as adversary but as conciliator.

He

In so doing,
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he is paying heed to the legitimate claims of a public
sentiment

gr~wn

impatient with the words of peace, sung to

the cadence of war.
So, I address a word of hope especially to you men and
women of this graduating class.

Your generation can take a great

deal of credit for bringing about this change.

Your manifest

disenchantment with the foreign policies of the past and with
the tragic travesty in the name of peace in Indochina has been
impressed on Washington.

You have underscored the point that

government is itself governed, in the final analysis, by the
depth and degree of public support which can be commanded for
its policies.
You have helped to inject balance into official channels
and, hopefully, to assure that government will not soon again
indulge in meaningless adventures abroad, largely at the expense
of young life .

If we are, in fact, going through the last Viet Nam,

if we are, in fact, getting out at last, as I devoutly hope, you
have done your share to that end.

To be sure, the millenium has not yet arrived.

Doomsday

missiles in the United States point at doomsday missiles several
thousand miles and a few minutes away.
on the mainland of Southeast Asia.

We still have vast garrisons

Planes are still engaged in

raining terror out of the Indochina skies.

Ships sow the

instruments of destruction in the waters south of China.

Indeed,

the Secretary of Defense has just told us that the spread of
conflict, by sea and air, once again into North Viet Nam--this
latest episode in the continuing agony of the Indochina War,
will cost the people of the nation an additional

$5

billion

this year, not to speak of more lives, more prisoners-of-war,
and more missing in action.
Nor should we overlook, in any note of optimism, the
social and economic overload which arises at home from these and
other wasting demands abroad; the capacities of the nation are
great but they are not unlimited.

The strain of serving, for a

quarter-of-a-century as the world's leading policeman, banker,
pioneer in space and what-not shows in the prices that are paid
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It shows, too, in the neglect

of the environment, in the decay of cities and in the rise of
crime, drug addiction and other barometers of social breakdown
within our society.
Before we can speak of any real light at the end of the
tunnel, we must face up to the immediate problems of the transition
from the exertions of war to the work of peace.

That the

adjustments can be difficult and painful has been brought home to
us by the President's announcement that the ABM site at Malmstrom
will become inoperative under the terms of the Nixon-Brezhnev
treaty.

In this case, as in many others, we must find--the

federal government has an obligation to assist in finding-constructive alternatives.
These qualifications aside, however, the fact ts that the
world has come a long distance towards sanity and order in the
short space of a few months.

That is why, in my judgment, the

class of 1972 can look with some confidence to the future.

- 5 There is a chance that the evil genies which have plagued us for
a quarter century can be put back securely in the bottle.
Consider what has been achieved by the diplomacy of the
past year.

What comes to mind most vividly, of course, is the

President's just completed journey to Moscow.

The accords

which were concluded there were highly significant in themselves.
Yet, the most important result of the Moscow summit may be found
not in specific achievements. Rather, it may emerge from the
changes of national attitude on both sides which were reflected
in the meetings.
The results of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks indicated a clear
acceptance of mutual self-interest as the basis for the future
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.
We have not always been very prompt in the past to recognize
nat i onal self-interest as a basis for a policy of peace.

To be

sure, we have sometimes over-assumed a national interest, as in
Viet Nam and on that basis, spent the lives of tens of thousands

- 6 of Americans and permitted over $130 bjllion dollars to be sucked
up by the destructive sponge of that conflict.

Now, after years

of this deadly wastage we have at last discovered that our only
valid national concern is to get back the prisoners of war and
the recoverable missing in action.

We have come at last to

realize that our only national interest is to get out of the
Indochina involvement, lock, stock and barrel.
If on s0me occasions we have over-assumed natjonal interests,
on others, we have ignored them almost as though they were not
fitting to a great power.

So, we have hesitated to define our

bona fide concerns and pursued, instead, the will o'the wisp of
ideological conflict.

We have done so on the basis of such

slogans as "Make the World Safe for Democracy," and most recently
the "Battle for the Minds of Men" or the "Containment of Communism.

11

The pursuit of ideological struggle has not led us to any victories.
Rather, it has projected us into a hodge-podge of foreign aid,
military alliances and into overseas propaganda and other dubious

-

mnnlpulntlve oper:1 ti onB .

'(

-

'!'he wnrm humA.n conce rn or Amerl cHnc

f or other peo ples has been distorted by ideological wa rfare nnd
we have plunged, w· th r> u.t warrnnt, l nt n the internal pr:>lltlcal
and social affairs of other nnt lr:>no everywhere In the wo r l d.
For two decades this costly exerc1se has bec ome
hundreds of thousands o f Americans, some

:l f

A.

way of l lfe ror

whom have scarcely

set foot tn the Unl.ted States f o r many years.

If there ls a new

light of hope, It is In large part bec a use this rand om flalllng
appears t o be coming t o Rn end.

In plnce o f the cacophr:>ny o f the

Cold War, the recent Moscow conference spoke softly of "Basic
Pr i nciples o f Mutual RelA.tl ons between the Unl.ted StA.tes and the
U.S.S.R.''

In these principles, the twn nations rec ognized that

there Is no feasible answer In a nuclear age to the pro spect of
mutual annlhilatlon other than mutual coll aboration.
The two pr:>wers have begun, now, to move toward what President
Nixon has called a posi tion of "mutually agreed restraint" In
a rmaments.

To that end, a treaty has been negotiated by President

- '3 Nixon to limit offensive and defensive strategi.c nuclear weapons
on both sides.

As I have already indicated, this treaty has a

special meaning for Montana because it is expected that Malmstrom
will not be devel oped now as an ABM site .

In the circumstances,

what I told the Senate in opposing the ABM program three years
ago bears repeating today.

On April l, 1969, I said:

"If this

proposed ABM missile system ... is right for the nat i on, it will
be right for Montana.

If it is wrong for the nat i on, however, the

location of one s j te at Malmstrom cannot make it rLght.
"What economic benefit to a Montana community will equal
the additional tax burdens and the new inflati on which will
weigh on all the people of Montana ... ?

If the system becomes an

insatiable maw for the consumption of public resources, who will
pay for the neglect of other urgent needs, if not all the people
of the nation including Montanans?"
That was my position on the ABM three years ago .
my position.

It remains

I will support the President in regard to the

Nixon-Brezhnev Treaty.

- 9 The diplomacy by wh i ch the treaty was negotiated is s i milar
to that which led the President to take the first steps in
breaking down the barr iers of isolation and separation with the
People's Republic of China.

To digress for a moment for a personal

note, let me say that on March 29, 1968, I gave the first lecture
sponsored by the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation at the
University.

The subject was "China:

Retrospect and Prospect."

My remarks, four years ago, contained this statement:
"It ought to be made unequivocal that we are
prepared at all t i mes to meet with Chinese
representatives--formally or informally--in
order to consider differences between China
and the United States over Viet Nam or any other
question of common concern."
The President's visit to Peking early this year which
was followed by the journey of the Senate Minority Leader and
myself a few weeks ago, has now made unequivocal the readiness
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of this nat·on to meet with China to the end that difficulties
may be dissolved and civil contact restored between the two
peoples.

Four years is a long tjme.

it is a beginning.

It is a long delay--but

The Great Wall of separation has commenced

to crumble and the way to a stable peace in Asia is opening at last.
What the President has done with regard to the Chinese
Pe,ple's Republic is to remove a self-imposed straight-jacket
on the foreign policies of the nation.

Following World War II,

for example, rather than face the great upheaval which had taken
place in China, we chose not to recognize but to quarantine it.
We cut ourselves off from contact with these monumental changes,
thinking all the while that by so doing we somehow could exercise
political control over them.

In retrospect, it is clear that we

had little or no effect over the course of events.
The fact is that there was a viable and independent
government in control in China for many years before we chose
to acknowledge that such was the case.

It availed us nothing

- ll to ignore and isolate ourselves from that government.

Yet, we

continued to do so long after this policy had lost the last
shred of a rationale.
Now that myths have begun to be replaced by realit i es,
we can proceed to explore wjth the People's Republic of China,
as the President has started to do with the Soviet Union, the
possibilities of mutual accommodatjon.

The change comes very late.

Already, as I have indicated, the economy of the nation reveals
the stresses imposed by unrealist i c and excessively c o stly
foreign-defense policies.

Last year, for example, it was necessary

to devalue the dollar, to raise import dut i es and to impose
domestic controls to prevent a catastro phic breakdown in the
nation's financial grid.

The process of adjustment had been

delayed too long to make a g raceful and painless transiti o n and
it will be prudent to antic i pate still other shocks in the future.
Nevertheless, we are now moving in the d i rection of
mutuality, of a sharing of responsibilities and leadership wi th

- 12 -

other nations.

In part, this process depends on negotiations.

In part, however, it is possible to take unilateral actions.
It is not always necessary to await the pleasure of others in
order to lighten our self-imposed burdens.

I ha ve, f or example,

not hesitated to urge unilateral action at various times wi th
regard to Vi et Nam in an effort to bring the involvement to a
more rapid conclus ion.

I have done so because the ending of this

mistaken adventure is our problem and our problem alone.

Every

day that the involvement persists adds to the burdens of the
people of th i s nation, to the list of dead and wounded and to the
devastat ion of the hapless peopl e of Indochina.
an interest in our withdrawal from this conflict.

Others may have
But none has

a more vital interest than th i s nation in getting out wi thout delay.
I have also urged unilateral action to bring about a
substantial reduction of U. S. forces in Europe.

There is no

rhyme or reason, in my judgment, to keep more than half-million
U. S. military personnel and dependents in Western Europe a quarter

- 13 of a century after World War II at the expense of the people

of the United States.

Whatever purposes of foreign policy the

U. S. garrison in Europe may still serve, the same purposes can
be met by a far smaller contingent.

As it is now, this enormous

deployment is a drain on U. S. revenues; it is fuel for inflation
in the United States and it is a major source of the weakness of
the dollar in relation to the currencies of other nations.
I have stressed this issue time and again against the
resistance of the Executive Branch under the Administrations of
three Presidents.

Insofar as I am c oncerned, it will continue

to be stressed, notwithstanding the Moscow agreements which call
for negotiation of mutual and balanced reductions of forces in
Europe.

The fact is that the Soviet Union does not pay for this

antiquated and largely irrelevant U. S. deployment.
do not pay for it .

their taxes.

The Europeans

The people of this nation pay the cost in

I see no particular virtue in prolonged negotiations

with the Russians to bring about a reduction of U. S. forces which

- 14 should have been done years ago in our own interest.

I am

appalled to think of the billions which have already been
wasted in this long waiting game.
There was a time within the clear remembrance of many of
us here today, when the rhetoric of Cold War was part and parcel
of policy.

That was a time when there did not appear to be any

mutuality of interests between East and West and when it would
have been futile to urge unilateral steps to reduce tensions.
Those were the days when each nation was what George Washington
so correctly described as the

11

slave of its own animosity.

11

The essential fact in precipitating the Cold War was that
two powerful new forces--ideology and technology--came together at
the close of World War II.

Th j s fusion vastly complicated the

whole interplay of international affairs.
problem was awesome in its simplicity.

The technological

With the great flood of

scientific and engineering advances, governments came into
possession of the power of instant and worldwide destruction.
In consequence, the processes of statecraft were compressed in
time and altered radically in conduct.

- 15 In th i s country there was a Constitutional fall-out from
these technological developments.

The power of the Executive

Branch in foreign affairs increased drastically even as the
power of legislatures shrank in proportion.

In crises, so it

was reasoned, there would not be time to make political decisions,
much less debate the issues.

At the same time, the new technology

of war, by its scope and complexity, became more than ever a
partner of government, with a vested interest in its own perpetuity
and a h igh potential for distorting public decisions about war
and peace.
The other aspect of the Cold War--the ideological problem-arose from the fact that two of the victors in World War II--the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China--were revolutionary
states committed to a system of social and economic organization
which was anathema to this nation.

The conspiratorial aspect of

Communism posed a particularly painful problem for the United
States, breeding suspicion, distrust and division in government.

- 16 It became difficult to separate valid threats to national
security from the bombast of the power-seekers.

Enlightened

public debate became constrained and as a result public policy
was not always subjected as fully as it should have been to the
purgative of critical challenge.

So the political paroxysms

of the '50's led to the rigid policies of the •6o•s.
History may well record that we pursued the correct foreign
policies into the early 1960's; that we bought time, through
containment and counterforce, to permit the gradual moderation
of Communist power, thereby reducing the Marxist states to the
political d i mensions of other nat j_ons.

However that may be, it

has been apparent for some time that we persisted in these policies
too long.

We were blind to changes elsewhere and to the possibili-

ties of adjust i ng to mutual interest.
the disaster of Viet Nam.

In the end, we came to

It is part of the price which has been

exacted for the obstinate pursuit of the obsolete in foreign
policy.

- 17 How can it be prevented from happening again?

Quite

possibly the world will not soon see a repetition of the
particular confluence of historical forces--ideology and
technology--which produced the rigidities of the Cold War.
Possibly, the awareness of our own electorate may now be such
that prolonged periods of national self-delusion will no longer
be countenanced.

Perhaps, more effective techniques will be

found in the art of government which will act to limber the dead
weight of massive bureaucracy and so bring about a greater
responsiveness to changing circumstances both at home and
abroad.

Perhaps, the addition of the under-21-voters to the

electorate will revitalize the entire political process.

In

any event, it is doubtful that your generation--seared as it
has been by the folly and outrage of Viet Nam--will long
suffer in silence a foreign policy which is based on the
outdated.

- 18 In the final analysis it comes down to the degree
to which an enlightened and vigorous electorate will probe
and test and call to account the policies of its own government.
President Brewster of Yale has put it in these words:
"Exposure, questioning, reappraisal are often
painful, even agonizing; their price is nothing,
however, compared to the resentment aroused by a
feeling of manipulated ignorance."
Your generation has some reason to feel, I'm sure, that
it has paid the high price of "manipulated ignorance."

At least

you have the advantage of knowing clearly what your generation
must avoid.

I am confident that you can and will not only skirt

the pitfalls of the past, but being thus spared the old burdens,
you will be free to explore the vast possibilities of mutual
accommodation with all peoples in a world which is now beginning
to be liberated from its obsolete fears.
You can do no more.

You should do no less.

